Looking doubtfully on prospects of the re-birth of a large US merchant fleet
 Next month marks a year since US President Donald Trump issued his Executive Order known as the Maritime Action Plan (MAP), a sweeping directive intended to restore the US merchant fleet to something resembling its post–World War II glory. The plan promised to rebuild America’s maritime industrial base, revive shipbuilding, and expand the US-flagged fleet, which has dwindled to less than one per cent of global commercial shipping. Yet 12 months on, the prospects of a genuine rebirth remain doubtful.
From the late 19th century through the mid-20th century, the US Merchant Marine was a formidable force. It supported America’s rise as an industrial power, producing large numbers of commercial vessels that carried a significant share of global trade. Its peak came during World War II, when the United States built more than 5,000 merchant ships, including Liberty and Victory ships, at unprecedented speed. These vessels transported troops, weapons, and supplies worldwide, making the US fleet the backbone of Allied logistics. By war’s end, the US controlled the largest merchant fleet in the world, supported by unmatched shipbuilding capacity and government cargo preference laws that guaranteed work for US-flagged vessels.
But by the 1970s and 1980s, US dominance had slipped. Foreign shipyards in Japan, South Korea, and later China produced ships far more cheaply. Higher labour costs and regulatory burdens made US-flagged vessels uncompetitive, prompting owners to reflag under “flags of convenience” such as Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands. Today, the US fleet is a shadow of its former self.
Trump’s MAP sought to reverse this decline. The Executive Order, titled “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance,” mandated a comprehensive strategy to rebuild the maritime industrial base. It triggered the Defense Production Act Title III, directing the Secretary of Defense to explore investments in shipbuilding and maritime capacity. It also called for revitalising the US Merchant Marine Academy to train a new generation of officers and seafarers, and proposed incentives for domestic shipbuilding, including regulatory reforms and infrastructure expansion in ports and shipyards.
Yet from the outset, challenges loomed. US shipbuilding remains far more expensive than foreign competitors. Decades of decline have hollowed out the workforce, requiring long-term investment in training. Global competition is fierce, with allies and rivals alike producing ships at a fraction of US costs. Regulatory reform, while potentially speeding construction, risks undermining safety and environmental standards. These trade-offs make the MAP’s ambitions difficult to realise.
The administration framed the project as a national security initiative, arguing that the US must be able to transport military and commercial goods without relying on foreign-flagged vessels. In theory, MAP was designed not just to expand the fleet but to rebuild maritime dominance by strengthening industrial capacity, workforce training, and strategic autonomy. In practice, however, the initiative has so far produced policy directives and studies rather than concrete spending. No major federal appropriations or private-sector investments have been announced. The Department of Defense and Department of Transportation are still assessing industrial base gaps, while ports and shipyards identified as priorities await funding mechanisms. The Merchant Marine Academy is slated for revitalisation, but budget details remain pending.
In short, MAP is a framework rather than a funded programme. Without substantial appropriations or private capital, the fleet cannot grow. Reliance on the Defense Production Act suggests spending could eventually be significant, but this remains contingent on agency recommendations and congressional approval.
Congress has begun to engage. Last June, the House passed a suite of bills aimed at reinforcing maritime sovereignty. One measure, HR 2035 “American Cargo for American Ships,” requires that 100 per cent of Department of Transportation–financed cargo be shipped on US-flagged, American-crewed vessels, up from the previous 50 per cent. Alabama Republican Congressman Jerry Carl argued that Congress must “create demand for US ships” to make MAP viable. Such bills also emphasise port security and resilience, ensuring US ports are less dependent on foreign-built equipment.
Yet scepticism abounds. Critics warn that without subsidies or guaranteed contracts, private industry will not invest, leaving taxpayers to shoulder the burden. Mandates requiring cargo to move on US-flagged vessels could raise shipping costs for exporters, potentially hurting competitiveness. Congressional involvement is crucial because the Executive Order alone cannot fund or enforce fleet expansion. MAP sets out a vision, but appropriations and mandates must come from Congress. The passage of HR 2035 shows momentum, but debates over cost and feasibility suggest this will remain contested.
Industry voices are divided. Congressman Carl insists mandates are essential to national security and independence from Chinese shipping dominance. Maritime attorneys R Christian Johnsen and Richard Bertram praised the Executive Order as a “comprehensive agenda” to rebuild shipbuilding capacity and workforce, stressing its strategic importance for both economic and defence security. But others caution that MAP lacks clear funding commitments. Without appropriations or guaranteed contracts, private industry is unlikely to invest.
Maritime historian Salvatore Mercogliano of Campbell University has been sharply critical, arguing that US shipbuilding is too expensive and inefficient to support large-scale fleet expansion without massive subsidies. He called MAP a “costly exercise in nostalgia” rather than a viable industrial strategy. John Konrad, CEO of gCaptain, echoed this view, describing the initiative as “politically attractive but economically unrealistic” unless paired with deep reforms and sustained appropriations.
The political obstacles are formidable. MAP’s successful achievement would involve enormous government spending, something Republicans traditionally resist and Democrats are unlikely to support given their hostility to Trump. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent captured the partisan divide with a quip: “If Trump cured cancer, they’d say ‘Yeah, but it causes dandruff.’” In such an environment, even the most cursory cost-benefit analysis suggests MAP will remain on the back burner.
The vision of restoring America’s merchant fleet to its former dominance is stirring, evoking memories of Liberty ships and the industrial might that once underpinned US global leadership. But nostalgia alone cannot overcome the economic realities of global shipbuilding. Unless Congress commits billions in subsidies and guarantees, and unless private industry sees a clear path to profitability, the rebirth of a large US merchant fleet will remain more aspiration than reality. For now, MAP is a plan without funding, a strategy without ships, and a promise unlikely to be fulfilled any time soon. |
