Can the FMC be deployed to protect BCOs hit by events like the Hanjin collapse?
 At this year's TPM Asia conference in Shenzhen, the city that borders Hong Kong and whose population now touches 20 million, the focus was mostly on the Asia-Europe trade.
But at the BCO (beneficial cargo owners) session, there was greater emphasis on the transpacific, and American problems than there had been with earlier sessions oriented as they were to the Asia-Europe trade.
Before getting to the BCO panelists main concern with the Hanjin collapse and having boxes still at sea, they agreed on one aspect of liner reliability - that it was less to do with ships being on time and more to do with the boxes being on time.
To questions about port-to-port reliability of shipping lines, they were largely satisfied.
Said Car gill transport chief John McCauley: "Ships are not the problem today. If you ship a container from Rotterdam to Shanghai you can set your clock on the time is gets to Shanghai. Reliability is 99.9 per cent.
"But if you say how many TEU - as opposed to ships - arrive on time then your statistics go through the roof. It's a system issue not a carrier issue. The carrier gets the brunt of the blame," he said.
Carrier hold-ups are often berthing delays, and with fuel costs declining, ships can afford race ahead to catch up to their schedules.
The big topic here and throughout the conference was the Hanjin Shipping bankruptcy, which BCOs felt was treated far too lightly in Asia. It was their cargo on stranded ships at the height of their revenue season.
Upset by the handling of Hanjin collapse, was panel member Pat Moffett, vice president of Vex International, a small consumer electronics company on Long Island, New York, with an annual revenue of US$757.4 million.
"This Hanjin situation is a complete mess. I thought it was treated lightly here when all the stats came out. I'm a BCO. I'm out there. I'm watching a ship that can't come near the pier. My holiday season is here - I'm over. I'm out of business," he said, speaking figuratively for his class as much as himself.
"We do things in our industry which are good - the VGM [verified gross mass container weigh-ins]. So the IMO says we got to do this, we got to do that. All has to be weighed before it goes on ships. This is wonderful," he said, his voice tinged with irony.
"What do we say in our business? We just take it; we say we will get it done, we get used to it and we move on. That's what we do for a living," he said with the resignation of an old hand who knows his place on the waterfront.
"The other part is General Average - you know Admiralty Law - two ships collide. There's a lot of damage it can be millions of dollars. The master declares General Average and everybody knows what to do. All parties to the sea venture will be responsible for the total loss according to law. But Hanjin goes into bankruptcy and everyone stands around saying no one covered that one. What do we do?
"And that's where these alliances come in. They have their own financial interests at the same time, but they are not in bankruptcy. And I don't see how they get into this. The IMO, the WTO - all your O's - this has got to be protected, the BCO wants to be protected from here on out," he said,
Fair's fair, he protested. Every other disaster has prescribed rules and regulations on its handling. but not a bankruptcy of the size of Hanging's.
Mr Moffett felt that somebody should shoulder the responsibility. Perhaps the alliance or a pool of alliances.
Mr McCauley, the man from Car gill, Minnesota-based food producer with annual revenues of $107 billion, was also sympathetic and less critical of the carriers.
What makes the Hanjin collapse so special is it enormous size. "This is 10 to 20 times bigger than anything we have seen before," he said.
"I think the IMO [UN's International Maritime Organisation] has a role, perhaps the FMC [US Federal Maritime Commission] can say when assessing alliances how they can have some surety in place around that. That's possibly a role for them," he said.
As a BCO, Mr McCauley was critical of South Korea. "There was a lack of concern by the industry players in Korea to fully understand what would be the implications on global trade and 'Korea Inc' as a maritime nation. There is an element that says we have to take responsibility as a maritime nation," he said.
As for causes, Mr McCauley said the trouble resulted from under investment industry-wide.
Much of the conference concerned about how one might dodge the bullet of being ensnared by someone else's bankruptcy. Most agreed Hanjin was a surprise because Hyundai Merchant Marine was in worse shape.
What's more there were other times when other carriers staved off bankruptcy by appealing to a to a creditor or a shareholder for funds. But despite its relatively better position Hanjin enjoyed, it did not have the charm and good looks to induce a rescue.
But the problem is a general one. The industry is in bad shape and under investment is rife throughout.
Said Mr McCauley: "I think we are looking at years of under investment if you think of their results.
As for alliances the question remains of what will be the exact composition of each. Largely speaking it looks like no carrier could be outside. There are a few outside, but I don't think we are going to see a home for anyone else outside the existing names of those who are set out to join alliances."
He urged caution when assessing the Hanjin crisis. "The brands that existed pre-Hanjin are still there. The financial conditions are slightly worse. So if Hanjin didn't happen what would have we been talking about? We'd be talking about overcapacity, we'd be talking about fundamental issues such as the order book being more than it should be etc."
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